Knowledge and Religious Experience, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam

What is the character and general structure of the universe in

which we live? Is there a permanent

element in the constitution of this universe? How are we related

to it? What place do we occupy in it,

and what is the kind of conduct that befits the place we occ

upy? These questions are common to

religion, philosophy, and higher poetry. But the kind of knowledge

that poetic inspiration brings is

essentially individual in its character; it is figurative,

vague, and indefinite. Religion, in its more

advanced forms, rises higher than poetry. It moves from individua

l to society. In its attitude towards the

Ultimate Reality it is opposed to the limitations of man;

it enlarges his claims and holds out the

prospect of nothing less than a direct vision of Reality. Is

it then possible to apply the purely rational

method of philosophy to religion? The spirit of philosophy is one

of free inquiry. It suspects all

authority. Its function is to trace the uncritical assumptions

of human thought to their hiding places, and

in this pursuit it may finally end in denial or a frank admi

ssion of the incapacity of pure reason to reach

the Ultimate Reality. The essence of religion, on the other

hand, is faith; and faith, like the bird, sees its

‘trackless way’ unattended by intellect which, in the words o

f the great mystic poet of Islam, ‘only

waylays the living heart of man and robs it of the invisible

wealth of life that lies within’.

1

Yet it cannot

be denied that faith is more than mere feeling. It has s

omething like a cognitive content, and the

existence of rival parties— scholastics and mystics— in

the history of religion shows that idea is a vital

element in religion. Apart from this, religion on its doct

rinal side, as defined by Professor Whitehead,

is ‘a system of general truths which have the effect of trans

forming character when they are sincerely

held and vividly apprehended’.

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Now, since the transformation and guidance of man’s inner and outer

life is the essential aim of religion, it is obvious that

the general truths which it embodies must not

remain unsettled. No one would hazard action on the basis of a

doubtful principle of conduct. Indeed,

in view of its function, religion stands in greater need of a

rational foundation of its ultimate principles

than even the dogmas of science. Science may ignore a ratio

nal metaphysics; indeed, it has ignored it

so far. Religion can hardly afford to ignore the search for a

reconciliation of the oppositions of

experience and a justification of the environment in which hum

anity finds itself. That is why Professor

Whitehead has acutely remarked that ‘the ages of faith a

re the ages of rationalism’.

3

But to rationalize

faith is not to admit the superiority of philosophy over reli

gion. Philosophy, no doubt, has jurisdiction

to judge religion, but what is to be judged is of such a nature

that it will not submit to the jurisdiction of

philosophy except on its own terms. While sitting in judgement on

religion, philosophy cannot give

religion an inferior place among its data. Religion is not a

departmental affair; it is neither mere

thought, nor mere feeling, nor mere action; it is an expressi

on of the whole man. Thus, in the

evaluation of religion, philosophy must recognize the central pos

ition of religion and has no other

alternative but to admit it as something focal in the pro

cess of reflective synthesis. Nor is there any

reason to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially o

pposed to each other. They spring up from

the same root and complement each other. The one grasps Re

ality piecemeal, the other grasps it in its

wholeness. The one fixes its gaze on the eternal, the other

on the temporal aspect of Reality. The one is

present enjoyment of the whole of Reality; the other aims at

traversing the whole by slowly specifying

and closing up the various regions of the whole for exclusive obser

vation. Both are in need of each

other for mutual rejuvenation. Both seek visions of the same Re

ality which reveals itself to them in

accordance with their function in life. In fact, intuiti

on, as Bergson rightly says, is only a higher kind of

intellect.

4

The search for rational foundations in Islam may be regarded t

o have begun with the Prophet himself.

His constant prayer was: ‘God! grant me knowledge of the ultim

ate nature of things!’

5

The work of

later mystics and non-mystic rationalists forms an exceedingly

instructive chapter in the history of our

culture, inasmuch as it reveals a longing for a coherent system

of ideas, a spirit of whole-hearted

devotion to truth, as well as the limitations of the age, whi

ch rendered the various theological

movements in Islam less fruitful than they might have been i

n a different age. As we all know, Greek

philosophy has been a great cultural force in the history of Isl

am. Yet a careful study of the Qur’«n and

the various schools of scholastic theology that arose under the ins

piration of Greek thought disclose the

remarkable fact that while Greek philosophy very much broadened

the outlook of Muslim thinkers, it,

on the whole, obscured their vision of the Qur’«n. Socrates concentra

ted his attention on the human

world alone. To him the proper study of man was man and not

the world of plants, insects, and stars.

How unlike the spirit of the Qur’«n, which sees in the humble

bee a recipient of Divine inspiration

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and

constantly calls upon the reader to observe the perpetual c

hange of the winds, the alternation of day and

night, the clouds,

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the starry heavens,

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and the planets swimming through infinite space!

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As a true